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Abstract In institutional legal theory, norms and facts are reciprocally operating
elements: an interplay in which meaning construction is closely connected with
acting: the pragmatic understanding of legal language in terms of its uses. With the
semiotic elements of institutional theory, extended by the notion of ‘semiotic
groups’, an analytical framework can be constructed to analyze a case study on the
shifts in the concept of war which have taken place since the 1945 UN Charter and
in the aftermath of 9/11. The semiotic aspects of the institutional approach can offer
insight into the complexity of the processes of meaning attribution in the field of law
and war.
Introduction
Semiotics of law is far from a single theory. Apparently, legal semiotics is as diverse
as legal theory. Moreover, different concepts of law in legal theory may involve
semiotic elements [1, pp. 9–12]. In institutional legal theory, for instance, law and
its corresponding conduct are analyzed by emphasizing institutional facts, and by
explaining the existence of norms as thought objects, on the one hand, and
observable social institutions which correlate with it, on the other [2, pp. 6–7].
Indiscernible norms and individual action or social arrangements, externally
observable in character, are two sides of the same coin. In the institutional point of
view, ‘one cannot assign or even speak of priority’ [2, pp. 25–26], for norms and
acts are reciprocally operating elements [2, p. 20], an interplay in which meaning
attribution is strongly connected to acting.
Unlike the reciprocal approach of law in the institutional legal theory, the
relationship between norm and fact is traditionally presumed to be unilateral in
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character and is dominated by linear causality. Legislation is prior to governmental
interference with the freedom of citizens and their conduct—one of the require-
ments of the Rule of Law principle—and it is regularly seen as a tool for influencing
prospective behaviour.1 In this view, law functions as means to achieve certain
goals, i.e., legal words used as tools [3; 4 p. 247]. The concept of legislation as an
instrument of social control, also known as ‘social engineering’ [5, pp. 247–252],
presupposes that the rule causes conduct in a unilateral way. The underlying
assumption is that the rule’s legal message is communicated correctly, and is
successfully ‘transported’ one-sided from ‘law-giver’ to ‘law-taker’, from sender to
receiver, in order to become materialized into conduct.
The relationship between law and fact, between rule and conduct, will be
analyzed, applying the institutional viewpoint. In particular in the relationship
between the law of war and actual warfare, the semiotic-pragmatic institutional
understanding of legal language in terms of its uses may provide an insight into the
complex processes of transformation and shifts in the concept of war after the 1945
UN Charter and in the aftermath of 9/11. The developments and the shifts in the
field of war and law will be described in a case study, a case in point of the complex
processes of meaning construction in the relationship mentioned.
In Sect. 2, the semiotic aspects of institutional legal theory are scrutinized. The
case study on the shifts in de concept of war will be described in Sect. 3 and will be
analyzed from a semiotic-institutional viewpoint in Sect. 4. The relationship
between legal rules of war and patterns of actual warfare will be highlighted with
respect to the assumption of linearity between rules and acts and the processes of
sense construction in this relationship. In Sect. 5, conclusions will be drawn.
Law and Fact: Linear Causality or Interplay?
Introduction
The Rule of Law, the central principle of the constitutional Rechtsstaat, involves the
requirement that a legal rule can only be applied after it has been validly enacted. A
rule can never be applied with retroactive effect. Thus, the norm is always prior to
(the correction of) prospective behaviour and is, in this sense, a tool for social
control and the shaping of society [6]. The Rule of Law guarantees legal certainty.
Citizens can take cognizance of the legal rule’s message and know how to act upon
its provisions. The Rule of Law implicitly presupposes a clear-cut formulation of
the rule’s message and its univocal meaning.
This view of legislation became central after de Second World War: the further
development of the welfare state with legal rules used as tools emphasized the
optimism of creating a new society: the actualization of the ideas of the iustitia
distributiva. However, this instrumental concept of law became a subject of
1 Involving the material as well as the formal dimension of legislation. This paper concentrates on the
former, the latter is less relevant here.
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discussion under the pressure of the regulation crisis, during the 1980s,2 resulting in
a new concept of legislation, in which the use of open norms in legislation and
reciprocal aspects of self-regulation became more important. This new concept of
legislation was based on theoretical models of legal communication, in which
Teubner’s model of ‘reflexive law’ and ‘autopoiesis’ played a dominating role [7],
pp. 239–285; [8]. (In Sect. 2.4, Teuner’s model will be scrutinized.) Generally, this
new approach raised new challenges. Particularly when rules unilateral guarantee
citizens constitutional rights and democracy, reciprocal elements challenge the basic
principles of the Rechtsstaat.
Institutional Legal Theory
In their book An Institutional Theory of Law, Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger
give a definition of what they call an institutional fact. As opposed to ‘brute facts’,
i.e., facts that solely have to do with the physical existence of the material universe,
independent of the human will [2, p. 9], the essential feature of institutional facts is
that they are rule-defined. Similarly, the acts of playing chess are dependent from,
and cannot exist without, the rules of chess. Institutional facts involve duration in
time, independently of both, specific location in space, and specific physical
characteristics. Institutional facts are [2, p. 10]
facts in virtue of being statable as true statements. But what is stated is not true
simply because of the condition of the material world (…). On the contrary, it
is true in virtue of an interpretation of what happens in the world, an
interpretation of events, in the light of human practices and normative rules.
In the institutional view, the existence of law is not just fact [3], nor is law
separated from the facts [9], but the existence of law is an institutional fact. It is
essential for the institutional approach that the existence of a legal system forms the
interplay between a normative system and an observable social reality [2, p. 20],
even when norms are considered as ideal entities, not available for direct
observation, but only as mental pictures. In this way, the existence of an
indiscernible norm as an ideal entity is inextricably related to the existence of
observable patterns of behaviour in social reality. That is, events and human conduct
as institutional facts, obtain their meaning in the light of rules [1, p. 10; 2, p. 180].
That institutional facts involve duration in time is the result of a triadic structure,
in which institutive rules, consequential rules and terminative rules play an
important role [2, p. 20, 51–53]. Examples of institutional facts and legal institutions
are, for instance, contract and right of ownership. These institutional facts have a
temporal existence: they are set up, that is, instituted by the performance of some
act. For example, by getting on a bus and paying a fare to the driver, a contract
comes into being. The existence of a contract between each passenger and the bus
corporation is obvious not a matter of physical fact. Nevertheless, getting on a bus
2 The relationship between norm and conduct became the subject of several legal theories, in particular
with the decreasing effectiveness and the increasing complex of statute law since the beginning of the
1980s.
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and paying fare becomes a centrally significant fact that brings the contract into
existence. This pattern of observable social behaviour initiates the contract of
carriage and forms the institutive rule of contract [2, pp. 49–50]. The institutional
rule produces a whole set of further legal consequences (consequential rules), such
as further rights and powers, duties and liabilities. If, for instance, there should be a
crash and a passenger gets injured, a whole set of rules, resulting from the existence
of the contract, is available for the passenger to seek recompense in the law [2,
pp. 49–50]. Since these consequential rules continue in existence for a period of
time during which they generate legal consequences, it is also necessary to provide
for its terminations: the terminative rules.
From the view that institutional facts are rule-defined and have a temporal
dimension in the sequence institutive-consequential-terminative, it follows that
institutional facts can be initiated and finished, forming a sequence of different legal
institutions, in complex chains, ‘almost like biological molecules’ [10, p. 21]. Since
the institutive rule presupposes that the transformations from one legal institution
into the other, must be performed by acts, acts not only constitute an institutional
meaning, but they are also the external manifestations of an institutional meaning.
Thus, in the institutional point of view, ‘one cannot assign or even speak of
priority’ [2, pp. 25–26], for norms and acts are reciprocally operating elements [2, p.
20], an interplay in which meaning attribution is greatly connected with acting.
Institutional facts can generate ‘a proposition, whose truth not merely depends upon
the occurrence of acts or events in the world, but also upon the application of rules
to such acts or events’ [2, p. 51; 11, pp. 50–53]. Empirical acts generate institutional
meaning defined by rules. This approach diametrically opposes the classical view of
legal rules, that is, the idea that goal-oriented legislation determines conduct in a
linear-causal way. In the institutional approach, however, acts form the constitutive
momentum and point of departure for the construction of meaning. A legal system
forms the interplay between a normative legal language and an observable social
reality. As stated before, there is no priority of the one over the other, since norms
and acts are reciprocally operating elements.
The institutive/terminative rules presuppose that the transformations from one legal
institutions into another—leading to a sequence of legal institutions in complex
chains—is performed by acts. The legal system is conceived as the whole of
conceptual building blocks: acts, perceived by our senses as an external manifestation
and the institutional meaning of these acts. In this pragmatic approach, meaning is
obtained and attributed in terms of use and communication. Thus, aspects of sense-
making play a substantial role in institutional legal theory [1, p. 180]. Nevertheless, the
question of how meaning is constituted in the reciprocal processes of communication
and by whom remains unanswered. How can this implicit idea in the institutional view
be made more explicit? In the next section this question will be analyzed.
Legal rules as ‘Thought Objects’
The observation that legal rules refer to ‘supersensible’ [3, p. 223] mental entities is
considered to be one of the essential elements of law. Unlike the institutional legal
theory—which starts from the viewpoint that law consists of two dimensions,
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i.e., normative institutions (a set of rules) and real institutions (a set of patterns of
behaviour) [2, pp. 1–27]—Ruiter creates a model with three dimensions [12, pp. 24–
25]:
(i) the legitimate legal rule (the formal dimension), which comprises a message
(the material dimension);
(ii) the acts of the application of the rule by an official, and, in the case of a
conflict, a judge;
ii. a degree of rule-conforming patterns of behaviour in social practice.
Given the relationship between words and reality described above, it has been
concluded that, within these three categories, only subsystems (ii) and (iii) are
discernible [12, p. 25]: in other words, the acts of the official applying the rule are
perceptible (and, in the case of a conflict, the decision of the judge, both testing
factual behaviour against fictitious law (see ii)) and the rule-conforming patterns of
behaviour are observable in social practice (see iii). The legal rule itself is an
indiscernible construct; it is thought to be the basis of the two other subsystems: an
ideal entity to be distinguished from physical things [13], Iii). The imaginary reality
of the rule’s meaning can be distinguished in its perceptible application, that is, by
acts of officials, or, in the case of a conflict, by the acts of the judge. Only by acting
the institutional meaning is expressed. Wittgenstein’s frequently quoted ‘the
meaning is in the use’ also seems to be relevant in this context [14, p. 43].
In Ruiter’s more sophisticated model involving three subsystems, in particular
the second category of this model—i.e., (ii) the acts of application of the rules by
officials, and, in the case of a conflict, the acts of the judiciary—is relevant in this
paper and will be analyzed in its relationship with (i) rules and (iii) conduct.
Observable social practices express the existence of institutional meaning in the
light of the rules. This interplay is not exclusively restricted to the relationship
between normative and real institutions, as developed by MacCormick and
Weinberger, but takes place twice in Ruiter’s model. Firstly, it takes place when
the rule is applied by officials. When a conflict arises about the application of the
legal rule, the Court has the competence to take a final decision. Both police officers
and judges test the factual conduct against the institutional meaning of the fictitious
rule. Both ‘groups’ have their own framework of interpretation. This phenomenon
will be subject of analysis in the next section.
Semiotic Groups, Social Sub-Systems and Practices
The view of law as institutional fact implies that law cannot exist in the absence of
two empirical conditions: first, the existence of patterns of conduct, and secondly,
the existence of some group which actually attributes meaning to the observable
acts. Although institutional legal theory does not explicitly mention an interpreting
group, implicitly, the existence of such a group, which actually does attribute
meaning to the acts, is assumed [1, p. 179]. The statement that ‘the natural unit of
sociolinguistic taxonomy is not the language but the speech community’ [15, p. 56]
is connected to a range of sociolinguistic studies that draw the attention, in
particular, the theoretical applications that can be observed in legal contexts.
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Professional languages within the ‘legal system’, for instance, have sufficient
peculiarities to form a barrier to comprehension by those not members of the group.
Here we are in the presence of a group defined by language: a ‘semiotic group’ [16,
p. 6; Jackson 1995, p. 96]. In the broadest of terms, the definition of a semiotic
group is a group (a professional group, for instance) which makes sense of law in
ways sufficiently distinct from other groups [16, p. 6]. The legal system comprises a
series of interacting semiotic groups: legislatures, superior court judges, doctrinal
writers, police, crown administrators, etc. The system of signification, used by each
of these groups reinforce their self-identity in relation to other groups within the
legal system.
The notion of semiotic groups, although different in many aspects, is in essence
similar to the notion of segmentation of society into social groups—‘social sub-
systems’—developed by the German legal scholar and sociologist Teubner, in his
book Law as an Autopoietic System [8]. Teubner focuses on the shift from the
‘formal rationality’ of law of the 19th century to the substantive and goal-oriented
law in today’s regulatory state. By analysing evolutionary models of law and society
(Luhmann and Habermas), his objective is to outline an approach to change in law
and society that will allow us to see the current situation as a ‘crisis’ of legal and
social evolution and thus to situate the accounts of legalization/delegalization and
form/substance in a more comprehensive theory. In the descriptions of the neo-
evolutionary theories of the shift mentioned, it is striking that all emphasize the
autonomy of the legal system. ‘For the neo-evolutionists, legal autonomy means that
the law changes in reaction only to its own impulses, for the legal order—norms,
doctrines, institutions, organizations—reproduces itself’ [8, p. 36]. This self-
referential character of legal structures does not mean, however, that the legal
system is totally isolated from its social environment. ‘Legal structures (…)
reinterpret themselves, but in the light of external needs and demands. This means
that external changes are neither ignored, nor directly reflected according to a
‘stimulus-response scheme [8, pp. 43–44]. Law, economy, politics, professional
groups and disciplines, etc. are separate ‘systems’ of society, which have their own
rationality. The industrial sector, for instance, aims at profit, while the legal system
aims at regulating this field in the light of pollution problems, or regulating wages
and working times of the labourers. The autonomy of these functional ‘sub-
systems’, results in the fact that they are relatively closed in their internal self-
organisation, but partly open to external information. If legal information ‘enters’ a
sub-system, for instance the industrial sector, the information will be transformed in
the system’s own distinctions, codes and meanings [8, pp. 97–98].3
Teubner’s approach of social groups seems to have essential points in common
with the more broader definition of MacIntyre’s ‘practices’. MacIntyre defines
‘practices’ as ‘any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative
human activity’ [18, p. 187] bound together by rules. Every practice creates what
MacIntyre calls ‘internal goods’; that is, immaterial goods that cannot be known or
acquired in any way other than by participation in that particular practice [18,
3 Empirical research by Sally Falk Moore in the New York clothing industry may illustrate this
theoretical notion [17].
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p. 189]. Which means that ‘those who lack the relevant experience are incompetent
thereby as judges of internal goods.’ [18, p. 189] In this view, particular practices
differ from each other, since practices create their own internal framework for
interpretation. Practices originate and develop from within: the practice is self-
referential. When faced with a change in its environment, a practice will react in terms
that reflect its own internal organization and its own internal self-understanding. Like
Teubner’s social sub-systems and Jackson’s semiotic groups, practices will always
react to its environment in terms of its own internal organization and corresponding
codes. Outside information or interaction with other groups or practices will be
transformed in the system’s own distinctions and meanings.
When we extrapolate the line, set out in Teubner’s theory, and apply it to the
legal system, the judiciary, the officials and the legislature may be regarded as three
distinct groups. As a result of the phenomenon that rule-information between sub-
systems is not simply ‘transported’ but is distorted while entering the other system,
different sub-systems make sense of legal information distinctly from other sub-
systems. The degree of autonomy of the interpreting groups correlates with the
‘resistance’ they offer against different (dissenting) interpretations of other groups,
as well as with their power to impose their own interpretation on other groups. The
notion of semiotic groups and the institutional-pragmatic approach form together
the elements for an analytical instrument. In the next paragraph, the case study on
the shifts on the concept of war will be described (Sect. 3) and will be analyzed by
applying the institutional-pragmatic framework including its semiotic aspects, in
Sect. 4.
Warfare and the Law of War: A Case Study
Article 96 of the Dutch Constitution and the Law of War
Article 96 of the Dutch Constitution guarantees democratic procedures for a
declaration of war.4 Since a decision to start a war has far-reaching consequences
for citizens, the government needs prior approval from Parliament. With the
declaration of war, the normally existing ‘state of peace’ is transformed into a ‘state
of war’. In a ‘state of war’, the law of war (jus in bello) binds the belligerent
parties.5 This clear dividing point between war and peace has its origins in the work
of the 17th century famous Dutch jurist and humanist Hugo Grotius. In his book
De Jure Belli ac Pacem, Grotius stated that ‘inter bellum et pacem nihil est medium’
[19, p. 852].6 Thus, war and peace are to be distinguished as two mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive legal states. The declaration of war is the dividing point
between the two. There is nothing in between. This point of view dominated
4 Article 96 states: ‘A declaration that the Kingdom is in a state of war shall not be made without the
prior approval of parliament.’ In Dutch the Article reads: ‘Het Koninkrijk wordt niet in oorlog verklaard
dan na voorafgaande toestemming van de Staten-Generaal.’
5 The law of war—jus in bello—concerns acceptable practices while engaged in war, to be distinguished
from the jus ad bellum, which concerns the law on just causes for starting a war.
6 ‘There is nothing between war and peace.’
War as an Institutional Fact Semiotics and Institutional Legal Theory 313
123
doctrine until the beginning of the 20th century [20, p. 285]. After the Second World
War, it was clear that this distinction no longer held.
In 1945, after the great disaster of the Second World War, the United Nations
Charter was enacted prohibiting the threat or the use of force between states.7
Due to the prohibition of interstate force, the declaration of war, laid down in
Article 96 of the Dutch Constitution, fell into disuse. However, the UN Charter
leaves some room for the declaration of war, that is, in case of self-defence, after a
military attack by another state.8 With respect to this, it can be concluded that the
scope and the meaning of Article 96 was fundamentally transformed. It changed
from a constitutive statement that starts a war de facto and de jure, to a mere
declaratory statement, i.e., the legal recognition of an already existing situation of
war [21, p. 102; 22, p. 173]. However, although the substantive meaning of Article
96 was dramatically transformed, it is remarkable that the text of the Article
remained unchanged.
A new Category of War?
As a result of the prohibition in the UN Charter, the ‘state of war’, no longer comes
into effect. This has consequences for the applicability of the law of war, that
provides rules for warfare, like the use of weapons, the treatment of war prisoners,
the sick and the wounded, and the protection of civilians in times of war, as laid
down in the Geneva Conventions.9 In principle, the law of war only applies in a
legal state of war, which, as said, no longer occurs. However, de facto warfare can
be observed: acts of war, without bearing the name ‘war’ or without having the legal
status of ‘war’. This phenomenon raises the question of whether the law of war
applies to such war situations. The answer must be in the negative.
This undesirable consequence was discussed in the 1950s and resulted in a
change of the rules of the Geneva Conventions,10 making them applicable not only
to a state of war, but also in all situations of armed conflict between two or more
states even if they are not recognized as war by one of the parties. The Dutch Penal
Code (Wetboek van strafrecht), too, was changed in the same way, in order to make
7 Article 2(4) UN Charter: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the thread or
the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’
8 Article 51 of the UN Charter states: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.’
9 The First, Second, Third and Fourth 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols I and
II together form the core of international humanitarian law, the jus in bello, the law of war.
10 Article 2 of the First Geneva Convention states: ‘In addition to the provisions which shall be
implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of
war is not recognized by one of them.’ (My italics).
314 H. van Schooten
123
crimes of war also applicable in situations of armed conflict not being a state of
war.11
By changing the Geneva Conventions in addition to the two mutually exclusive
(i) states of peace and (ii) states of war, a new, third category came into existence:
(iii) the armed conflict. Being neither peace nor war, the category of an armed
conflict—a status mixtus—is situated ‘somewhere’ between the state of peace and
the state of war. With respect to these three categories, the applicability of the law of
war is clear.12
Next to the category of armed conflicts, another category of war acts came into
being, the legal status of which fundamentally lacks clarity [25, pp. 134–153]:
peacekeeping missions. This new category involves military actions in foreign
states, based on the rules of the UN Charter,13 in order to maintain or restore peace
and international security. Article 42 of the Charter states that the collective action
can be taken not only after a breach of the peace, but in all cases where the Security
Council determines that a threat to the peace exists. Not only the number, but also
the size, functions, and strategies of peacekeeping missions have been altered. The
function of peacekeeping missions has moved beyond interposition and cease-fire
monitoring to include election supervision, nation building and a wide range of
other functions. Peacekeeping has also adopted more coercive tactics and strategies,
making it increasingly less distinct from collective enforcement actions. The
presence of international military units in Afghanistan and Iraq can be taken as
examples for peacekeeping missions with a more robust character. These collective
operations, legitimized by the UN Charter and carried out by the Member States, are
qualified as ‘peacekeeping’,14 but are in fact military operations, characterized by
warfare. The lack of clarity about the legal status and the legal meaning of these
missions causes severe problems. In previous publications, I have amply analyzed
the issue [23, 24]. The uncertainty about the legal meaning of these missions is also
reflected in the case law.15 In particular, the Eric O. case is a striking example for
the unclear legal status of the peacekeeping mission in Iraq.16
11 A new Article 107a Penal Code was added, which states that the criminal offence of Article 102—
aiding the enemy in wartime—is also applicable ‘in the event of an armed conflict that cannot be
designated a war.’ (My italics).
12 However, it is not completely clear what the definition of an armed conflict is. For instance, the
question of whether an internal civil war has to be considered an armed conflict [23, 24].
13 Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in particular Article 42.
14 Attempts to classify different types of peacekeeping have been quite elementary. Since the end of the
Cold War, scholars have begun to refer to more recent operations as ‘new peacekeeping’ or ‘second
generation’ missions. Other classifications implicitly combine mission function, timing, and level of
coercion, to derive the popular categories of peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace building, and peace
enforcement, although the actual meaning of these terms varies widely [26].
15 Eric O. case, Gerechtshof Arnhem [Arnhem Court of Appeal], 21-006275-04, www.rechtspraak.nl,
LJN: AT4899. Slapende mariniers [Sleeping Marines case], Rechtbank Arnhem [Arnhem District Court],
1 maart 2004, NJ 2004, 206.
16 Resolution 1441 (Security Council, 8 November 2002), gave Iraq ‘A final opportunity to comply with
its disarmament obligations.’ Efforts aimed at a new Council resolution authorizing the invasion in Iraq,
but they did not succeed. Iraq was nevertheless invaded on 20 March 2003 without an authorization of the
Security Council. Afterwards, Resolution 1483 (22 May 2003) affirmed that the United States and the
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The Eric O. Case
Dutch sergeant-major Eric O. took part in the peacekeeping mission in Iraq. While
fulfilling his duties and tasks as the commander of the QRF Battalion (Quick
Reaction Force), O. fired a warning shot in a threatening situation that by accident
killed an Iraqi, on 27 December 2003. O. was arrested as a suspect on 31 December
2003. He was directly flown to the Netherlands, where he was imprisoned and
prosecuted by the Public Prosecutor for manslaughter on the basis of Article 307 of
the Dutch Penal Code, which is valid law in times of peace. However, the judges
of the Arnhem District Court (Military Division), emphasized the special situation
of warfare in which the act had taken place, pointing at the Rules of Engagement
(ROE),17 i.e., specific rules enacted for the mission in Iraq, and acquitted Eric O. of
the charge.18
The prosecutor appealed against the Arnhem District Court’s decision. The
attitude of the Public Prosecution Service was later on qualified by the Arnhem
Court of Appeal as one of a particular tenacity. The Advocate General of the Public
Prosecution Service held to his demand of manslaughter (Article 307 Dutch Penal
Code) by stating that the peacekeeping mission in Iraq was a state in which two
competing parties without sovereignty claims fight each other, which had led to an
internal state collapse, in which Dutch military units intervened on behalf of the
UN. For this reason, the use of force was excluded. He answered the question of
whether the Netherlands, as a military party, was involved in a conflict in Iraq in the
negative. Eric O. was not a military component of a party involved, but an expert on
mission. The status of the Dutch military units was that of ‘regular trooper’
responsible for ‘non-military tasks.’ Thus no rules were applicable other than those
of the common Dutch Penal Code, the rules that apply in times of peace.
The Arnhem Court of Appeal, again, concentrated on the ROE, as a part of the
Memorandum of Understanding, based on Resolutions 1483 and 1511 of the UN
Security Council, which were evidently applicable, valid rules for the mission in
Iraq, in particular Article 151 of the ROE, which allows the passing of warnings.19
The warning shot fired by O. could not be regarded as substantially imprudent,
negligent, or careless. The Court of Appeal, too, acquitted O. of the charge.20
Footnote 16 continued
United Kingdom had responsibility for Iraq as the ‘‘occupying powers under unified command’’. Its three
most important features are that it empowered the US–UK coalition, making it the legitimate and legal
governing and peacekeeping authority; recognized the creation of a transitional governing council of
Iraqis; and removed all sanctions against Iraq that were placed upon the former regime of Saddam
Hussein, additionally terminating the (now unnecessary) Oil-for-Food Program.
17 In particular, Article 151 of the ROE.
18 LJN: AR4029, Rechtbank Arnhem [Arnhem District Court], 05/097011-03.
19 Article 151 of the ROE states: ‘Passing of warnings to any person, aircraft, vehicle or vessel by any
means in circumstances where MND(SE) forces or elements under MND(SE) protection or the mission
are threatened or where the passes of warnings is necessary for purposes of execution of the mission is
authorized.’ MND(SE) stands for Multinational Division (South East).
20 Eric O. case, Gerechtshof Arnhem [Arnhem Court of Appeal] 21-006275-04, www.rechtspraak.nl,
LJN: AT4899.
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This specific case, expressing the lack of clarity with respect to the legal meaning
of actual warfare, puts the instrumental and unilateral concept of legislation under
discussion. It raises the question of whether reciprocal elements exist in the
relationship between rule and conduct, and how the meaning of warfare is
constructed in this relationship. Here, actual warfare was taken as a point of
departure; a constitutive momentum for meaning construction within different
professional groups results in different legal meanings of these war acts. In the next
section this paradoxical issue will be scrutinized, using institutional legal theory as
an instrument of analysis.
Shifts in the Concept of War: A Semiotic-Institutional Analysis
A unilateral Relationship or an Interplay?
If war is considered to be a legal institution and acts of war to be institutional facts,
what can be concluded with respect to the relationship between the rule as a thought
object [2, p. 6] and discernible patterns of conduct? Is it, as is generally presumed, an
unilateral concept of legislation, in which the rule’s legal message is ‘transported’ in
a one-sided ‘flow model’ of information from ‘rule-giver’ to ‘rule-taker’? What
constitutes the meaning of warfare in this relationship and by whom?
In the institutional approach the existence of law as legal institutions is a matter
of what is actually existent in social reality: acts constitute institutional facts that
materialize indiscernible rules. The institutional view emphasizes the mutual
relationship between socially existent norms and observable features of social life
and take the basis of legal dynamics to lie in this very interplay [2, p. 20]. Taking
the act as a constitutive momentum, the rule does not exclusively determine conduct
in an instrumental way, as the classical approach of goal-oriented legislation
assumes, but the social acts constitute legal institutions and are embedded in sets of
rules, that create an institutional landscape [27, p. 156].
Article 96
With respect to the case study on the shifts in the concept of war, related to the
fundamental changes in Article 96 of the Dutch Constitution, it can be stated, in the
first place, that the meaning of the Article (not its text, which remained unchanged)
was transformed by political practice, that is, in political discourse, in governmental
acts and decisions on war, as well as in the existence of actual warfare. Thus, the
transformation of the meaning of Article 96, guaranteeing citizens the right of
democracy in the far-reaching decisions on war, was not initiated by the legislature
and Parliament, as it should be.21 This means that the Article’s message did not
unilaterally impose its democratic procedures on the government by prescribing
how to act when taking a war decision. On the contrary, social and political
21 Changing the text of Articles in the (rigid) Dutch Constitution requires lengthy procedures and new
elections.
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practices determined in a reciprocal way the meaning transformation of the Article,
resulting in an erosion of democracy principle and an undermining of the principle
of the Rule of Law. It has to be noticed that reciprocity in the relationship between
norms and acts, which is generally seen as a positive element, as an alternative,
participating form of the traditional representative principle of democratic, has
rather negative consequences here.
Peacekeeping Missions
With respect to the new category of war—the peacekeeping missions—it was stated
that this category came into being in the interplay between the rules of the UN
Charter and the patterns of actual warfare as a social phenomenon. Taking the
peacekeeping mission in Iraq as an example, it can be stated that it resulted from the
ideal of the Charter, banning war and creating peace by force, and finally ending in
horrors of warfare, thousands of people injured and the loss of thousands of
militaries and civilian lives. The relationship between rules and acts, between the
ideal of the Charter and the acts of warfare, generally dominated by the instrumental
concept of linear causality, is, here too, under discussion.
With respect to the meaning of the category ‘peacekeeping missions’, we can
observe that military operations take place, acts of war that are qualified as
‘peacekeeping’, legitimized and justified in the Charter by their just cause:
maintaining or restoring peace and security. Nevertheless, these peacekeeping
missions themselves have become observable phenomena of warfare. This
confusing situation triggered the question: is a peacekeeping mission a state of
peace, a state of war, or an armed conflict not recognized as war?22 To put it
differently, what is the institutional meaning of a peacekeeping mission?
Semiotic Groups
If war is considered to be a legal institution and acts of war to be institutional facts,
the following conclusions can be made with respect to the construction of meaning
in the case study. Actual observable warfare, in the institutional view, generates
institutional meaning. How is this meaning generated? Within the three dimensions
of Ruiter’s model, i.e., a set of rules, acts of officials and judges, and patterns of
behaviour in social practice, in particular the acts of officials, and in case of a
conflict the acts of the judiciary are pivotal. In terms of semiotic groups, which
make sense of law in ways sufficiently distinct from other groups, two semiotic
groups can be distinguished here: the Public Prosecutor, on the one hand, and the
judges, on the other. Within these groups external information will be transformed
in the system’s own distinctions and meanings. Both professional groups attributed
two completely different institutional meanings to the same acts of war. The Public
Prosecutor insisted on Article 307 of the Penal Code, valid law in times of peace,
the judges of the Districts Court and the Court of Appeal insisted on the Rules of
Engagement, valid rules in situations of war. The conflict before both Courts
22 The law of war applies only to the two last-mentioned categories.
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concentrated on the choice between two different rules with an opposite meaning.
Although the judges, as one semiotic group, attributed their institutional meaning to
the conduct; their ascendancy over the Public Prosecutor, as the other semiotic
group, remained unclear. However, following Teubner’s concept of law as an
‘autopoietic system’ comprising different sub-systems, it may be concluded that the
degree of autonomy of a semiotic group correlates with its power to impose its own
interpretation on other groups.
Final Remarks
By applying an institutional analysis to the case study on the shift in the concept of
war, the ‘flows’ of rule information and the creation of meaning in this flow were
shown. The question was posed of whether law, generally seen as a goal-orientated
instrument that is linear causal in character, involves reciprocal elements of
meaning attribution. This question had to be answered in the affirmative.
In the relationship between observable conduct and the indiscernible rule as a
mental entity, professional groups within the legal system play an important role.
These groups, which fit in the notion of ‘semiotic groups’, reform and interpret
observable acts as external information and transform its meaning into the group’s
own codes. The semiotic-pragmatic structure of institutional legal theory presup-
poses (and leaves room for) the existence of such an interpreting group, in order to
explain the complex situation of interpreting acts in the light of normative
institutions. An analysis of the case study showed that a situation of actual warfare,
can be interpreted in two different legal meanings by two different groups, namely,
(i) a peacekeeping mission, involving actual and observable acts of warfare, is a
situation of peace, to which the Penal Code, valid law in times of peace, is
applicable, and (ii) a peacekeeping mission, involving actual and observable acts of
warfare, is a situation of war, to which the law of war is applicable.
Abandoning the idea of goal-oriented legislation in favour of the idea of
legislation as a form of institutional landscaping, means that the problem of its
effectiveness and its flow of information is put in a different light. The idea of
legislative institution-building, the interplay between normative and real institu-
tions, and the reciprocally constructed meaning by officials and judges as different
semiotic groups, disentangles the complexity in the field of war and law and offers
an opportunity to study legal texts and legal discourse.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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